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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Q~F THE STATE Q~p UTAH 
BRIGHAM B. HARVEY and 
RUTH M. HARVEY, 
Plaintiffs arnd Respondents, 
-vs.-
HAIGHTS BENCH IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 




The Statement of Facts by Appellant is not accept-
able. The case was tried to a jury. The conflicts in the 
evidence were resolved in our favor, and on appeal we 
are entitled to have the court accept as the facts the 
view of the evidence most favorable to our position. 
We, accordingly, believe that a further statement of 
facts is necessary. 
STATEJYIENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are the owners of a tract of real prop-
erty, whi,ch is situated about one-half mile easterly from 
the oiled highway north of Farmington, (R. 45). Prior 
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to the times herein complained of, the Weber Basin 
Conservancy District had commenced the construction 
of an aqueduct to bring water to this area. Respondents 
had subscribed to 100 acre feet of water, and the water 
will be delivered to the land in a pipeline under pressure 
above the land to the east, so that the water will flow to 
the land under pressure, (R. 64). The land is presently 
uncultivated, but is used for livestock grazing purposes. 
It had a value at the times material hereto of $1,000.00 
an acre, (R. 64 and 108). The development of the area 
does not make the land immediately usable for subdivi-
sion purposes, and if it were now ready for subdivision, 
it would have a higher value, (R. 104). 
An expert called by the defendants testified that 
the land was worth $100.00 per acre for strictly agri-
cultural uses, (R. 150). He was unable to express any 
opinion as to '"·hether the changes made by the appellant 
to the ditch and surrounding land had diminished its 
Yalue for that purpose, (R .. 151). ~Ir. Harvey, one of 
the respondents, testified that it (the work of appellant) 
had rPduced the YahH-., (R. 65) as did ~Ir. Horace Beesley, 
a rPal estate agent called by respondents, (R. 105). Thus, 
there is affirmatiYe evidence from t\YO different wit-
TI(lSS(\s that t hP laud value ha ~ been reduced, and there 
is no 'vitn('ss \vho testified to the contrary. 
It \vas admittt)d that appellant owns a prescriptive 
ri•rht. to mnintain n. canal aeross the ahoYe described .~ 
land. Thn eanul \\·as used to transport ·w .. ater from Farm-
ing1on (~anyon. Watt)r from this source is only available 
until about the 4th of July, (R. 46). From the 4th of 
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July on through at least until late Fall, no water was 
transported in the canal, ( R. 156). 
In its condition prior to the work done by appellant, 
livestock could readily cross the canal. The canal was 
an average of eight feet wide, and the banks were 
sloping. At high water the flow was about two feet deep, 
(R. 54). There was no danger to livestock. 
In the fall of 1955, appellant, for the purpose of 
waterproofing the ditch, entered upon the lands of the 
respondents. They took a bulldozer down the east bank 
and pushed over numerous large oak trees and cotton-
wood trees and left the debris where it fell, (R. 48). In 
maintaining the canal through the prescriptive period, 
appellant had never occupied the east bank of the canal 
for any purposes. The trees which were pushed over 
and destroyed on the east bank had for fifty years been 
undisturbed, (R. 49, 72). The oaks were up to six inches 
in diameter, (R. 48). There were only two places along 
the entire east bank through plaintiffs' property where 
the work was done that it was even possible, prior to 
the work done and herein complained of, for a team of 
horses to get out on the east side of the canal, (R. 168). 
There previously had been piled on the west bank 
sand and gravel and silt from the cleaning of the canal. 
The bank was not in a condition where motor vehicles 
could have gone along it, (R. 180 & 49 & 59). Appellant 
levelled off the west bank and constructed a road along 
it, the excess dirt was sloughed off the bulldozer blade 
to the west, leaving an area which was cleared of trees 
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by the bulldozer up to approximately 45 feet wide, in-
cluding the width of the canal, (R. 50). After so clearing 
both sides of the canal of trees and after constructing a 
road where none had theretofore existed, appellant in-
stalled a concrete ditch, which is seven feet wide across 
the top, fourteen inches wide across the bottom and 
thirty-six inches deep, (R. 57). 
Before doing the work, one of the officers of appel-
lant went to the wife of Mr. Harvey and told her that 
they wanted to do some work on the ditch, (R. 197). He 
did not tell her that they were going to cement it, (R. 
197). He did not tell her that they were going to build 
a. road, nor destroy the trees, or any of the details of 
the work, (R. 198). He did not even tell her the work 
was going to be done on respondents' property, (R. 198), 
nor did he get permission from respondents to do the 
work which was done. 
Thereafter, Mr. Harv~y saw appellant's employees 
\vorking. He complained concerning the construction of 
the ditch at that time. He later met the President of the 
appellant company before the cement ditch was installed, 
and requested that the appellant not install that type 
of ditch, (R. 59). The President said that he would take 
it up with the Board, (R. 60). Mr. Harvey then met with 
the Board and told them he objected to the type of ditch 
being constructed, and again requested them not to 
proceed, (R. 60}. The Board refused his request, and 
indicated that they were going to go forward with their 
program, (R. 60). Mr. Harvey then retained counsel, 
who in writing advised the appellant company not to 
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proceed, (R. 61). Nevertheless, the company ignored the 
wishes of the plaintiff. Over his repeated objection, they 
installed the cement ditch described above, left the debris 
scattered along his land (R. 48 and 74), and left him no 
crossing across the canal, (R. 75). 
As to the type of ditch construction, it is readily 
admitted by everyone that it would be almost impossible 
for livestock to cross it. The sloping sides, the narrow 
bottom, and the 36 inch depth, coupled with the 7 foot 
top width, make it dangerous. The cement ditch extends 
beyond the property of the plaintiff on the north, leaving 
him no way to get around the ditch to the north without 
going off his own land, (R. 173). The ditch is 750 feet 
long, and in this 750 foot length there is no way to cross 
it, (R. 173). Livestock would be endangered if they tried 
to drink from the canal. Even large animals like horses 
would not voluntarily have crossed the ditch, so that it 
effectively cut the land in two, (R. 62). 
The engineer called by respondents testified that he 
would not have recommended that type of ditch for this 
land, (R. 94). While this type might be slightly cheaper, 
he said the difference in cost would have been very 
slight, (R. 85-86). A ditch design with a wider bottom 
and without so much depth would have accommodated 
every problem of the irrigation company equally as well 
as would this one. The difference in cost was practically 
nil, (R. 85-86). When the ditch was full, evaporation 
losses would have been less with a square-type ditch, 
because with a wider bottom, the top surface (from 
which evaporation took place) would have been nar-
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rower. There is now no practical way for the plaintiffs 
to overcome the damage that has been done. To cover 
the ditch now would cost approximately $10,000.00, (R. 
137). He could establish a crossing through construction 
of bridges and he could, of course, clean up the debris 
they left on his land, but he can't overcome the danger 
to livestock, and, of course, it would take 50 years to 
regrow the trees to the size they were when they were 
destroyed, (R. 72). 
Engineers were called by appellant to testify that 
the ditch constructed was the most efficient, but when 
they were asked to define what they meant by "efficient", 
they said it meant only that it was the cheapest, (R. 134, 
138, 118). There was testimony to the effect that the 
Government would not participate in the cost under its 
various agricultural programs unless this type of ditch 
was constructed, but on cross-examination the witnesses 
admitted that the Government had a short time before 
participated in the cost of a wider and shallower section 
of ditch on this same canal, and that the Government 
approval probably could have been had, (R. 137). In 
any event, the testimony from appellant's engineers to 
the extent it conflicts with the testimony of Engineer 
Kelly, must be disregarded, because the jury found the 
issues in favor of the plaintiffs. Engineer Kelly was 
definite and unequivocal. He stated that there is no con-
sideration which would have justified this type of design 
through this type of land. A shallower, wider ditch 
(wider at the bottom) could have been constructed at 
substantially the same cost, (R. 97). It would not have 
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been so < langerous, ( R. 89). The evaporation losses 
would have been about the same, (R. 97), and the type 
of design chosen must, under the findings of the jury, 
be accepted as being more hazardous to livestock, im-
practical to cross, more dangerous to children, and it 
decreased the value of plaintiffs' land. In this regard 
it should be noted that the jury allowed only $400.00 
actual damage for (1) reduced land value; (2) the 
damage caused by the leaving of no practical means of 
crossing the canal; (3) leaving to the plaintiffs also the 
expense of cleaning up the debris; and ( 4) the destruc.-
tion of the trees and the building of a road. Certainly 
these factors would more than justify the $400.00 award. 
The evidence shows, without dispute, that appellant 
has taken more land in the doing of the work complained 
of here than it has ever before used. It never used any 
part of the east bank. The trees grew down to the water 
line. The oak trees were five to six inches in diameter 
and were about 50 years old. Even teams of horses could 
not get out of the canal on that side except at two points, 
(R. 190). The taking of the strip of land down the east 
bank as shown by the pictures and described by the 
witnesses, is clearly the taking of land never before used 
by appellant. On the west bank they have constructed 
a road that theretofore never existed, (R. 185 and 181). 
They have widened an area occupied. They have also 
destroyed the trees along the west bank, (R. 182). The 
evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that previous to 
this time the canal was cleaned first by putting teams 
of horses in the bottom of the canal and scraping the 
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silt on to the west bank. In more recent times it has 
been cleaned by putting tractors in the bottom of the 
canal, lifting the debris out with a front-end loader and 
depositing it on the bank, (R. 190). Members of the 
public on occasion have gone with wagons and hauled 
this sand and gravel away, but the irrigation company 
has not done so, (R. 189-190), and there was no road 
or defined wheel track along the bank and this loading 
was only at the south end, (R. 49, 181, 185). 
What this court must decide on this appeal Is 
whether under the laws of the State of Utah the owner 
of a prescriptive right of way for a canal can, in order 
to waterproof it, (a) select the cheapest possible design 
over the protest of the landowner, where another design 
nearly as cheap and equally as efficient would remove 
much of the inconvenience and damage to the landowner ; 
(b) whether in waterproofing a canal the owner of a 
prescriptive right of way can destroy trees which have 
existed along the bank for 50 years; (c) \Yhether an 
8 foot wide canal, which historically has been maintained 
by operating equipment in the canal can be changed so 
as to occupy a strip of ground 45 feet wide; ( 5) whether 
without the landowner's permission, and over his protest 
the owner of a prescriptive easeme11t can construct a 
roadway along the banks of the canal; (e) and whether 
in waterproofing a canal, the owner of the prescriptive 
right can in addition to pushing over the trees, leave the 
debris therefrom scattered hither and yon across the 
land of the servient tenant, and (f) construct a ditch, so 
designed that it effectively cuts the land in two and leaves 
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him no crossings. If all of these things can be done 
without liability, then, indeed, the entire concept of 
private property must completely prostitute itself to the 
convenience of the owner of a prescriptive way. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court endeavored to follow the principles 
pronounced in Big Cottonwood Tam;n.er Ditch Co. v. 
JJ!l oyle, 109 Utah 213, 17 4 P. 2d 148. The instructions 
given to the jury as to the rights of the prescriptive 
owner were taken almost verbatim from that case. When 
the Moyle case was first argued, the Supreme Court held 
that where a prescriptive easement confers an incidental 
benefit on the servient estate, the benefit cannot be taken 
away without giving up the easement. See Big Cotton-
wood Tanrner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 197, 159 P. 
2d 596. 
A petition for rehearing was filed and joined in by 
numerous irrigation companies. They argued that if in 
order to waterproof a ditch it was necessary to start 
from scratch and condemn an entirely new easement, 
waterproofing would become so expensive as to be im-
possible. The court granted a rehearing and permitted 
the pendulum to swing entirely to the opposite side, and 
while only one other judge concurred with the rationale 
of the author judge, the majority of the court has appar-
ently held that there is a right to enlarge the burden 
on the servient estate under certain conditions. We feel 
that this holding violates the due process clauses of the 
State and Federal Constitutions, and takes private 
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property for public use without compensation. We will 
argue this in detail under the section entitled Cross-
Appeal. 
The Supreme Court in the Moyle case, however, did 
not hold that the owner of the prescriptive right of way 
had the unbridled right to do as it pleased on the land 
of the servient estate. The right to waterproof a ditch 
could increase the burden on the servient estate only 
under the following conditions, which are reflected 111 
the following quotations from the JJ!l oyle case : 
''It follows that under the common law of this 
state and under the circumstances of the prescrip-
tive user in this case the easement acquired by 
plaintiff was for the purpose of carrying irriga-
tion water in ditches across the lands of defend-
ants and included among other things the right, in 
the interests of water conservation, to improve 
the method of carrying said irrigation water and 
the right of entry to effect said improvements. 
''Though the right to improve the ditches in 
the interests of water conservation is mthin the 
easement the irrigation company has across de-
fendants' land it does not follow the company can 
exercise that right in any manner it sees fit. 
''The rights of the dominant owner are limited 
by the rights of the servient O\Yner. Pioneer Irri-
gation District v. Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 285 P. 474. 
Each owner must exercise his rights so as not 
unreasonably to interfere \Yith the other.'' 
"* * * Defendants haYe 110 legal grounds of 
complaint if additional burdens are cast on their 
estate by plaintiff's exercise of the right, included 
in its easement, to improve the ditches so long as 
that right is reasonably exercised. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''What is a reasonable manner for the com-
pany to improve a particular ditch is a question 
of fact to be decided after considering location of 
the ditch, the type and use of the property through 
\vhich it flows, the amount of water it carries, the 
relative cost of the possible methods of water-
proofing and all other facts and circumstances 
bearing on the question.'' * * * 
"It may be the cheapest method for the com-
pany to improve its ditch would be an unreason-
able method because it would unnecessarily injure 
the servient owner. It may be that the equities of 
the case require a slightly less efficient means of 
conservation in order to prevent unnecessary in-
jury to the land owners. For example, in a narrow 
deep ditch less water would be lost due to evapora-
tion than in a wider shallower ditch carrying the 
same amount of water; yet it may be that the 
damage to the servient owner from having a 
narrow, deep ditch over his property would be so 
much greater than from having a wider shallower 
ditch that it would be reasonable to allow only 
the less efficient improvement. On the other hand, 
the irrigation company should not be required to 
use a very expensive or unusual method merely 
because of a whim of the land owner or because 
the use of said method would be slightly less bur-
densome to the servient estate. The equities must 
be weighed. Each case must be decided on its own 
particular facts. In no case would the easement 
owner be allowed in improving his ditch to take 
more or different land from the servient estate 
than that used during the prescriptive period.'' 
* * * 
"* * * In the case at bar, for the servient 
owners to have shown the method proposed un-
reasonable because it would cause unnecessary 
damage they would have had to show that another 
11 
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method available for use would cause substan-
tially less damage. This the owners have not 
done. As far as the record reveals, there is only 
one method of improvement practicably available 
to the irrigation company and that is the appar-
ently reasonable method proposed by it. If other 
methods for waterproofing and shaping the 
ditches were practicably available to the irriga-
tion company, which would effect the water con-
servation and would be materially less injurious 
to the servient estates, the servient owners should 
ha v.e revealed them. ' ' * * * 
''This opinion is in nowise a determination 
that the method of improving its ditches proposed 
by the irrigation company is under all the circum-
stances of this case a reasonable method and that 
it will cause no unnecessary damage to the servient 
estates. Our holding is that the servant owners 
filed in the court below to prove such method is 
unreasonable and they therefore were not entitled 
to have the irrigation company restrained from 
putting that method into effect.'' 
The evidence here shows that these conditions have 
been violated by appellant. One condition is that the 
owner of the prescriptive easement may not utilize more 
land than was used during the prescriptive period. 
There is no dispute in the evidence, and even if there 
were a dispute, the jury found the issues in our favor 
to the effect that the irrigation company destroyed the 
trees on a strip wide enough for a tractor down the 
entire east bank of the canal which had never before 
been occupied, (R. 49, 59). They destroyed the trees 
thereon which theretofore had been undisturbed for fifty 
years, (R. 54, 58). They built a road down the west side 
12 
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and pushed the bank debris outward, so that, with the 
width of the canal, they are occupying a space nearly 
45 feet, (R. 50), whereas, before the work was done the 
canal was an average of about eight feet wide, (R. 45), 
and they used the area on the south end to dump gravel 
and silt cleaned from the canal. Thus, the Moyle case 
held that appellant had no right to occupy more land 
and the evidence here shows the appellant has done so. 
The Moyle case also says that the waterproofing 
procedures followed must be reasonable, and must not 
unreasonably burden or inconvenience the servient 
estate. The court left to the jury the problem of deter-
mining whether or not under all of the facts and circum-
stances here the methods were reasonable. The jury 
found that they were not. The evidence which would 
have permitted such a finding came from Mr. Kelly, an 
engineer. He testified that this was not a proper design 
for this area. He stated the advantages and disadvan-
tages of this type of ditch. On the advantage side, the 
only element was that it was a. cheap type of construc-
tion, but the difference in cost between this and a more 
acceptable type ditch was slight, (R. 86). As disadvan-
tages, Mr. Kelly noted the danger coming from such a 
ditch; the inconvenience in crossing was noted by several 
witnesses, (R. 89-90). We will not again detail the 
evidence here. We submit that the jury was properly 
permitted to determine whether or not the design chosen 
was reasonable. 
There is nothing in the Moyle case which would 
permit the owner of the prescriptive right to construct 
13 
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a structure across the servient estate which could not 
be crossed by livestock or vehicles. This is neither 
necessary nor reasonable. The evidence is without dis-
pute that they made no crossing for respondents and 
that the structure they built cannot be crossed. 
There is nothing in the Moyle case that says they 
can push and destroy the trees that have grown up along 
the banks, nor that once having pushed them over they 
may leave the debris scattered haphazardly over the land 
of the servient estate. The evidence is uncontradicted 
that this is what they did in this case. We think on these 
last two items the piling of debris upon our lands and 
the construction of a ditch of this type which deprived 
us of access from one tract to another, we are entitled 
to a directed verdict, and that on these two items alone, 
the verdict is, as a matter of law, inadequate. 
It is perfectly all right for the law to develop along 
lines which will permit the conservation of water, but 
it is equally important, under our constitutional system 
of government, that the concept of private property be 
protected. The defendant constructed a dirt ditch across 
our lands, occupying a strip some eight feet wide. This 
did not disturb the growth of trees and shrubs through 
the area. For more than fifty years the trees growing 
along the banks were not disturbed. Appellant was able 
to maintain and clean the canal by worki11g its equipment 
in it. The servient estate holder was able to cross from 
one side to the other at almost any point. There was no 
particular danger to livestock left in the field. Yet 
appellant here moved onto the land, over the plaintiffs' 
14 
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violent objections, and threats of suit, took a bulldozer 
and pushed down their trees, cleared a strip up to 45 
feet wide through the center of their land, left them the 
debris, and no crossing. Appellant seeks here to make 
them absorb the hazards of the canal and give up addi-
tional lands. Its sole justification for it is that this was 
the cheapest way it could waterproof, and waterproofing 
\Vas desirable. Certainly, the Moyle case does not con-
template that the only test of reasonableness is cheap-
ness. Here appellant cannot even justify its actions on 
that ground, because under competent and unequivocal 
testimony, both from Mr. Kelly, our engineer, and Mr. 
Austin, appellant's engineer, the difference in cost was 
slight, (R. ______ ). The court properly instructed the jury 
under the doctrine of the Moyle case, and most assuredly 
the verdict for actual damages of only $400.00 is justi-
fied. Further, having given the plaintiff absolutely no 
consideration while he was attending the appellant's 
board meeting, and protesting its work, and threatening 
suit, punitive damages were entirely justified, and again 
the amount thereof was reasonable. If the Moyle case 
correctly states the law, then we submit that this verdict 
must be affirmed. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
We cross-appeal in this case, for two reasons: 
1. We think the Moyle case goes too far and places 
a greater burden on the servient estate than is necessary 
to encourage the conservation of water. 
15 
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2. The evidence stands uncontradicted to the effect 
that the defendant company intends to place water from 
new sources in the ditch and to place it in the ditch when 
it normally would have been dry. We deny that they 
have an easement for so doing, and until they acquire 
that easement, either by negotiation or by eminent 
domain, we deny that they have any right to take any 
water except under their water rights from Farmington 
Canyon across our lands. 
Our challenge to the Moyle case comes from the fact 
that we believe that the court there went too far. We 
do not contend for the original opinion. Where an ease-
ment for a ditch has been established by prescription, 
we do not contend for a presumption or holding that the 
servient estate was entitled to the seepage of water or 
incidental benefits. We deny, however, that it is neces-
sary to the conservation of water that the court swing 
to the other extreme and hold that (1) the irrigation 
company may maintain its present easement, but (2) it 
may go further and enlarge the easement and increase 
the burden without compensation. If the incidental 
benefit of seepage water is taken from the servient 
estate by waterproofing, and the prescriptive easement 
holder is upheld in its right to maintain the ditch, this 
should be enough. When it wants to enlarge the burden, 
it has the power of eminent domain. See N a.slz 'O. Clark, 
27 Utah 158, 75 P. 311. 
The measure of damages ought to be the difference 
in the value of the land burdened with the ditch as it 
was established by prescription, and without the benefits 
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on the one hand, as against the value of the land with 
the ditch as changed by the waterproofing. If there is a 
detriment or a loss by reason of the changes, (water-
proofing) upon what principles of morals or ethics ought 
that loss or burden to be borne by the servient estate~ 
The benefits from the change redound entirely to the 
owner of the easement. Why is it necessary in the devel-
opment of water la'v and the conservation of water to 
give to the dominant estate the benefits, and to require 
the servient estate to stand the detriments~ If the domi-
nant estate is permitted to maintain its prescriptive 
easement, and is also permitted to take from the servient 
estate holder, without compensation, any incidental bene-
fit from the easement, we think the court goes far enough. 
For the court to go one step further and hold that the 
servient estate holder must bear, without compensation, 
all of the increased burdens, makes the entire concept of 
private property yield to the desire for conservation of 
water. It is not unreasonable or burdensome to the 
owner of the ditch to require the ditch owner, who gets 
the benefit from the improvement, to stand the expense 
of the burden. We thus ask the court to re-examine the 
Moyle case, and contend that if the Moyle case is to be 
followed, it will deprive the owner of a servient estate 
of his property without due process of law. 
The Utah law as pronounced in the Moyle case 
• 
stands alone. Other Western irrigation states have not 
found it necessary to override the constitutional doc-
trine of private property, in order to permit reasonable 
conservation of water. See for example, Sm.ith vs. Rock 
Creek Water Corp., ______ (Cal.), 208 P. 2d 705. 
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It is uncontraverted that the appellant has acquired 
1300 acre feet of water under the Weber Basin Conserv-
ancy District Project, (R. 155) ; that it intends to put 
that water into the canal which crosses Respondents' 
lands, (R. 156). Previously only water from Farming-
ton Canyon has been taken across our lands. At high 
water this would be enough to fill the canal, but it would 
gradually reduce to nothing by about the 4th of July, 
(R. 156). The land thus was not burdened by any ease-
ment during July, August, September, etc. This does 
not involve conservation of water. Appellant simply is 
taking water from another water course and putting it 
across our land. It has no easement to so do. It will keep 
the canal nearly full all of the time, and will keep water 
in the canal at times when none would be there. Funda-
mental concepts of due process should, and we think do, 
prohibit this. We asked the trial court to so adjudge 
and to prohibit the taking of the Weber Basin water 
across our land until they had acquired the right to do 
so. They do have the right of eminent domain. They 
can take the water through us. The amount of damage 
may not be great, but they simply don't have the right 
to take their water through us from sources never before 
used. We think the holding of Nielsen r. Sandberg, 105 
Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696, is in point. In that case, the court 
said: 
''The use during the prescriptive period is the 
only indication of the nature and extent of the 
right acquired (citing cases). The servient estate 
can only be subjected to the easement to the 
extent of which the easement was acquired, and 
the easement owner cannot change this use so as 
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to put any greater burden upon the servient 
estate.'' 
The court then quotes with approval from ''Restate-
ment of Property'' as follows : 
''Thus a diversion of water for power pur-
poses is not, ordinarily at least, justifiable under 
an easement created by a diversion of water for 
purposes of irrigation.'' 
The court goes on to say that the right cannot be 
enlarged so as to place a greater burden on the servient 
estate. The court then says at page 103: 
''A right of way founded upon a deed or grant 
is limited to the uses, and the extent thereof as 
fixed by the grant or deed. If the easement is 
based upon the reservation in the patent, it is 
limited by the use and way of its exercise at the 
time of the patent. That right was merely the 
right to have water flow for power purposes, as 
that was all the use made at the time of patent. 
Of course, that right might be enlarged since 
patent, by prescription, but in that event, the 
claimant must stand on the prescription and the 
grant will be presumed to have been released and 
extinguished. Such prescriptive right would be 
limited by the nature and extent of use during 
the prescriptive period.'' 
Of course, in the Moyle case, supra, the author judge 
uses language out of harmony with the language quoted 
above. However, only one other judge concurred in the 
primary opinion, and the extent to which the various 
pronouncements of Mr. Justice Wolfe represent the 
present law, we think must yet be determined. We have 
no quarrel with the objective of conserving water and 
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preventing waste. It is not necessary, however, to 
destroy the whole concept of private property. If I had 
a. water right for one cubic foot of water and would 
burden your land by taking one foot across it, there just 
isn't any authority under which I can enlarge it to two 
feet or ten feet. In fact, there is considerable Utah 
authority to the contrary. See, for example, Stephens 
Ramch v. Union Pacific Railroad, 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 
459; Robin v. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340. Where 
as here, the prescriptive easement is for water from 
Farmington Canyon, which stays at high flow for a little 
while and dwindles to nothing, it is clearly an enlarge-
ment to maintain the 30 foot flow by placing water from 
other sources in the canal. It is also an enlargement to 
use our lands after July 4th. This, I repeat, is not con-
servation of water. It is simply a situation where the 
appellant having acquired a smaller right by prescrip-
tion is endeavoring to take our land for its own benefit 
without paying us for it. 
We respectfully submit that the court should have 
adjudged that we are entitled to an injunction against 
the intended enlargement of the easement. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Respondents 
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